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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The problem solving performance of children has been 
analyzed and compared by margr investigators. Several different 
methods and devices have been used for the purpose of analyzing 
this complex process. Tests of problem solving ability in 
which reading and enriched vocabulary play a large part are 
likely to be prejudiced in favor or subjects with higher intel­
ligence and against those from deprived areas. The Problem 
Box was designed by Teska (1942) in an effort to hold these 
factors to a minimum while measuring the problem solving ability 
of children or adults from various cultures and environments.
Comparative studies of problem solving ability have been 
made comparing such factors as mental age, chronological age, in­
telligence, and socio-economic level. Researchers generally agree 
that problem solving ability is least affected by chronological 
age. Few investigators have compared groups of the same chrono­
1
2logical age having different levels of intelligence. The interest 
in research in problem solving declined around the early part of 
the twentieth century. The interest of investigators in problem 
solving has gradually increased during the last few years, espe­
cially since i960. Problem solving is a significant function of 
human behavior appropriate for further investigatirai.
Steps in Problem Solving 
The five classical steps in problem solving were ini­
tially proposed by Dewey (191O): first, a felt difficulty 
or uneasiness; second, its location and definition; third, 
suggestions for a possible solution; fourth, development of 
the bearing of the suggestions by reasoning; and fifth, fur­
ther observation and experimentation leading to verification 
or rejection of the proposed solution, Dewey (1933) restated 
and elaborated upon these five phases, observing that the 
sequence is not fixed. In practice one of the steps may be 
passed over, one phase may be expanded to include sub^ diases, 
or two phases may telescope,
Symonds (1936) defined the process in four steps: first, 
isolating and defining the values that operate; second, proposing 
a variety of solutions ; third, estimating the consequences of the 
various alternatives; and fourth, making decisions based on 
proposed solutions whose outcomes have most bearing on or rela­
tionship to the values at stake, and based on the probability 
that certain outcmes would result,
Vinacke (1952) stated that only three stages may be
3logically distinguished; first, confrontation by a problem; 
second, working towaid a solution; and third, solution. His 
analysis of stage two includes steps two, three, and four as 
defined by Dewey.
D, M, Johnson (1955) said that in a very general way, 
problem solving consists of three steps: first, survey of
the problem and analysis of the goal; second, production of 
probable solution attempts; and third, evaluation and judgment 
of the attempts. He suggests that if the only solution 
produced is obviously correct, no separate act of evalua­
tion is necessary.
Merrifield et al. (1962) developed a modified theory 
of problem solving involving five phases as a result of study 
designed for this purpose: first, preparation; second, 
analysis; third, production; fourth, verification; and fifth 
reapplication. The writers stated that much backtracking can 
take place at almost any phase whenever progress is unsatis­
factory. Phase five is only necessary when a tentative 
solution has been rejected. When the solution is found to 
succeed, the problem no longer exists.
Guilford (196?) proposed a general problem solving 
operational model, based upon the above study in lAich he 
was a co-author, that resembles a flow-chart. The five principal 
operations are: first, filtering (attention aroused and directed); 
second, cognition (problem sensed and structured); third, 
production (answers generated); fourth, cognition (new infor­
mation obtained); and fifth, production (new answers generated).
4He suggests an exit after each of the five operations to 
indicate cessation of the process. The first exit nay be 
a rejection of the problem; the second exit may be a 
postponement or a problem impossible to solve, and the 
other exits may mean a satisfactoiy solution to the problem 
has occurred, A liberal allowance is made for looping 
phenonena that provides for feedback information and permits 
some flexibility in the order of events.
In a survey of the literature, D’Zurilla et al. (1971) 
found a remarkable degree of agreement awxig several theorists 
and investigators in the general kinds of operations involved 
in effective problem solving. Disregarding sme minor 
variations in wording and categorization, the consensus 
viewpoint is closely represented by the following five general 
stages: first, general orientation (set and attitudinal factors); 
second, problem definition and formulation; third, generation 
of alternatives; fourth, decision making (evaluation and 
selection); and fifth, verification. The writers suggest that 
problem solving seldom proceeds in these neatly ordered stages 
but more typically the stages overlap and interact with each 
other.
In view of the various descriptions of the problem 
solving process cited above, it is apparent that the first 
step is one of recognitiw, A problem has to be recognized 
as such and there has to be a need or desire for a solution 
on the part of the individual. The word "problem" implies 
choice. If there are no alternatives or choices available and
5understood by the individual, a ^ oblem does not exist for him.
Thus, a problem nay be presented by an investigator 
but the subject nay not be aware that a problem exists.
Dewey (1910) feels that at some point problem solving has 
to be a conscious process in order for one to reflect upon 
the factors involved. There is perhaps a ^ thesis in 
problem solving of the conscious and the unconscious. The 
unconscious lends to the process spontaneity and freshness; 
consciousness gives to the process a measure of conviction 
and control. If a solution is perceived along with the 
recognition of the problem, either a problem did not exist 
or the other steps in the process were mitted.
The second step is one of induction. It involves the 
location, isolation, definition and organization of the various 
elements or clues in search for generalizations. Isolation 
means to identify and separate the various clues. Definition 
is recognizing the values of the clues as either relevant to 
some degree or irrelevant. The relevant clues or el^ nents are 
organized into some meaningful edibles or generalizations. 
Organizing the data into related wholes leads to a better 
understanding of the data so that the process of hypothesizing 
is less difficult and the suggested hypotheses are more likely 
to be relevant to the solution of the problem. Dewey (1910) 
says, "The meaning suggested supplies a maital platform, an 
intellectual point of view, from which to note and define the 
data more carefully, to seek for additional observations, and 
to institute, experimentally, changed conditions" [p. 79 21
6The third step is to discover or to formulate the 
Iqrpotheses. About this Symonds (1936) says, "The matter of 
proposing hypotheses is in one sense the very heart of problem 
solving, particularly of the more constructive or creative 
sort" [p. I26j • The data must be logical in nature and 
organized to the point where meaningful constellations are 
generated or the proposed hypotheses may not be appropriate 
to the solution of the problem.
The fourth step is syllogistic in form, thus deductive 
in nature. It is the reasoning process of testing the validity 
of the generated hypotheses or generalizations against the 
organized data in search of a possible solution. This not only 
involves a preliminary check of the correctness of the pro­
posed hypotheses but also leads to a better understanding of 
the data. If the testing proves the proposed hypothesis to be 
wrong, other previously proposed hypotheses are tested or the 
data is reorganized in order to generate new and better hy­
potheses which is a return to the inductive reasoning step 
with a better understanding of the data.
The fifth step is one of further observation. This 
leads to a final acceptance or rejection of the solution.
As a result of this classical description of problem 
solving, an adequate test of the process can be better 
formulated so that all of the steps will be required as 
discretely as possible in order to evaluate the total process. 
However, problem solving may take place without proceeding in 
this sequence or through these formal steps. Some steps may be
7omitted, some steps may be telescoped, or the order may be 
inverted or transposed. In some instances, such as in trial 
and error, inductive reasoning is not used since analyzing 
and organizing the clues are not involved. If the nature 
of the data is such that it does not lend itself to an 
adequate test of all relevant Iqrpotheses, then deductive 
reasoning cannot be utilized. Inductive and deductive 
reasoning are fondamental in any problem solving process.
Review of the Literature 
Most of the early studies using multiple-choice were 
done with animals. These included studies by Burtt (l9l6). 
Cobum and Yerkes (1915), Hamilton (1911), Yerkes (1914, 1917), 
Yerkes and Cobum (1915) and Yerkes and Rossy (1917).
Yerkes (1921) investigated the ideational behavior of 
individuals using a modification of his earlier apparatus.
The earlier device consisted of an arrangement of twelve wooden 
keys that could be raised or lowered in any combination ly the 
experimenter. The subject made a choice by depressing one of 
the lowered keys. When the correct key was depressed a bell 
would ring. The modifications consisted of replacing the bell 
with a buzzer and arranging the twelve keys in such a way that 
they could be extended or withdrawn in aiy combination. Only 
the keys projecting out of the keyboard were accessible to 
be depressed by the subject.
Regardless of the combination of keys extended, the 
correct solutions of the four problems presented in sequence « 
were; the first key on the left, the first key at the left
8alternately with the first key on the right, the third key from 
the left, and the middle key. Two solutions were accepted; 
pressing the correct key in ten successive trials without 
formulation of the generalization involved, or pressing the 
correct key plus verbalization of the principle involved,
Yerkes (1921) compared groups of superior, average, 
defective, and pathological subjects. The superior group 
required fewer trials to solve each problwi. The average 
group was next but here was an overlapping between the 
average group and the defective group. It was pointed out 
that some subjects were capable of selecting the correct key 
each time but quite incapable of verbalizing the principle in­
volved in the solution. He suggests that such a solution is 
in "motor terms," common to average, mentally defective and 
pathological subjects. In the discussion he stated that 
regardless of the statistical significance of the data, the 
responses of each subject are illuminating and considered 
important in determining the "ideational characteristics."
Some subjects eliminated keys Qrstematieally, revealing 
confidence in their ability to solve the problem. Others used 
a random approach without displaying apy confidence in their 
ability to solve the problem.
The multiple-choice technique of Heidbreder (1928) 
involved the use of boxes in four problems: the one on the 
right, the flowered versus plain, the farther with plain figure, 
and the nearer with red dotted figures. The subjects ranged 
in chronological age from three to adults. It was found that
9the number of trials decreased with age, that verbal general­
isations were given by all subjects above six, and that the 
verbalisations of adults were more clear and objective,
Roberts (1932) used a moltiple-ehoice apparatus con­
sisting of a toy house with three different colored doors, a 
visible tpy inside could be obtained hy opening the door 
matching the color of the toy. The subjects were between 
the ages of two and five. It was found that all subjects 
solved the problem but none of the subjects below the age 
of three were able to verbalize their solutions,
Aarons (1933) compared serial learning and general­
izing abstraction using Yerkes (1921) multiple-choice 
technique versus learning the order of cards in a deck.
He found a low positive correlation between multiple-choice 
problem solving and serial learning as measured Iqr learning 
the order of cards.
Long and Welch (19^ 1) compared the ability of 135 
children between the ages of 30 and 83 months to match and 
discriminate numbers. Three problems were used: selecting 
the box containing the largest number of maztles in order 
to get a reward, matching the number of marbles in a single 
group, and matching the number of marbles in four groups,
A steady improvement by age in the ability to discriminate 
and match numbers was found, but a low positive corr^tion 
with intelligence was reported.
House and Zeaman (1958) compared two groups of 
institutionalized mentally defective children with two
10
groups of piblic school normal children of professional 
parents using a multiple-choice technique* The apparatus, 
modeled after the Wisconsin General Test Apparatus, had a 
low worktable toward the subject and a square box 72 inches 
high attached to the back of the worktable. During testing, 
this box concealed the examiner and the sliding stimulus 
tray when it was withdrawn from the subject between trials.
In the side of the box facing the subject was mounted a one­
way mirror. The sliding tray 30 inches wide contained 
two round food wells 2 inches in diameter and 12 inches 
apart. These food wells were covered by a pair of stimulus 
bases made of 4 inch by 4 inch Masonite. While the tray was 
concealed from the subject the examiner placed candy in the 
well under the correct response and then pushed the tray in 
front of the subject for each trial. The correct stimulus 
card was varied irregularly from left to right for each trial. 
There were 25 pairs of stimuli consisting of five forms 
(circle, square, triangle, cross, and T) in five different 
colors (red, green, yellow, white, and black), Twenty-five 
trials with about 15 second intervals between trials were 
given each day. The problem was considered as being solved 
when the subject made 20 correct choices out of 25 trials 
during a session. Each subject was ]j.aced in one of four 
groups according to mental age; defective with a M.A. of 4 years, 
normal with a M.A, of 4 years, defective with a M,A, of 5 years, 
and normal with a M.A. of 5 years. It was found that as mental 
age increased, errors decreased for both normals and defectives.
11
At the mental age level of four years the normals performed 
significantly better than the defectives, and at the mental 
age level of five years there was no significant difference.
The investigators pointed out that a more difficult problem 
would be required to discriminate between normals and 
defectives at the five year mental age level. It was con­
cluded that intelligence is related to learning ability with 
the mental age controlled.
Harter (1965) compared three groups of children using 
the same apparatus and procedures as House and Zeaman (1958) 
described above, except that an opaque screen was used as a 
shield instead of withdrawing the tray and different stimulus 
objects were used. These were 100 pairs of "junk" stereometric 
objects, one of each pair being arbitrarily designated as 
the "correct" object. A marble placed in the food-well was 
used as a reinforcer for a correct choice. Each subject 
continued daily sessions of ten problems (40 trials) until he 
attained the learning set criterion of five successive problems 
with no more than one error on trials two, three, and four of 
all five problems. Each subject was required to verbalize 
the solution to each problem solved. A total of 8l subjects 
were used, 42 boys and 39 girls, all in public school classes 
and never institutionalized. I.Q. scores were used as the 
basis for assigning subjects to one of three groups according 
to M.A.: 5 years, low group; 7 years, normal group; and 
9 years, high group. The approximate mean I.Q. scores of 
the groups were: low, 70; normal, 100; and high, above 130.
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The mean C.A. for each group was; 7t4), 10»»1, and 13-2 for the 
low; 6-9, and 9-1 for the normal; and 3^, 4-9, and 7-4 
for the high. The chronological ages of all subjects ranged 
from 3-4 to 13-2 years. An analysis of the data revealed 
that: (l) C.A. contributes very little to learning set
performance, (2) M.A. and I.Q. both influenced the learning 
set as revealed by comparing the number of problems required 
to form the learning set, (3) Some subjects who reached the 
criterion were unable to verbalize the solution, (4) All 
subjects reached the criterion in seven days or less,
(5) There were no significant differences between the per­
formances of boyS and girls, Harter (1965) pointed out that 
at each M.A. level, as the I,Q, level increased the learning 
set acquisition was accelerated. It appeared that some combi­
nation of I.Q. and M.A. level would be the best predictor of 
learning, M.A. level when taken as a developmental measure 
of cognitive level would be expected to predict speed of 
learning,
Harter (1967) used the same apparatus described 
previously [House and Zeaman (1958| to investigate the role 
of M.A. and I.Q. by comparing three levels of I.Q. ; 65, 100, 
and 130 and two levels of M.A. 5i and 8^ , The low group,
I.Q. level of 65, was represented by both institutionalized 
and noninstitutionalized subjects. Two social conditions were 
used, one with the examiner behind the one-way mirror and the 
other a face-to-face situation with the one-way mirror re­
moved plus fViendly conversation before testing and verbal
13
praise for correct solutions. Two equally qualified examiners 
were used in order to partially control for differences in 
effectiveness of adults as socially reinforcing agents. The 
same learning set criterion used by Harter (1965) was used 
in this study. The finding were: (i) There were no signi­
ficant sex differences, (2) Learning set acquisition was 
significantly faster at both the higher I,Q, and M,A, levels,
(3) The correlation between C.A, and learning set acquisition 
was not significant. (4) Learning set acquisition was faster 
in the noninstitutionalized than in the institutionalized 
retardates, (5) Learning set acquisition was faster for the 
lower I,Q, levds without social interaction, (6) Learning 
set acquisition was considerably faster for the higher I,Q, 
levels with social interaction, particularly at M,A, 5i.
Moffitt (1969) compared the problem solving performance 
of two groups of severely retarded children from the Cambridge 
State School using the same apparatus as House and Zeaman (1956) 
described previously. The stimuli, 4 inch by 4 inch cardboard 
bases covered with rough felt, consisted of an eight ly eight 
matrix, eight fonns and eight colors. On a day prior to the 
nine daily experimental sessions consisting of one 30 trial 
problem, each subject demonstrated that he could find the 
candy reinforcer. A reinforcement occurred once in each 
block of three problems. There were three controlled rein­
forcement conditions; 100$, 66$, and 3!^ * Subjects were placed 
in groups on the basis of test information on file; two levels 
of I.Q, (25-35, 36-46) and two levels of M,A, (4.0-6.9, 7.0-9.9),
14
The higher I.Q, groups performed significantly better than the 
lower I.Q. groups under all three peroentages of reinforcement. 
There were no significant differences between the low M.A. 
groups and the high M.A. groups.
Gosali (1969) investigated the cognitive styles of 
retarded primary students using a circular versicn of Kagan's 
Matching Familiar Figures instrument c<msisting of 20 pictures 
of familiar objects. Each item consisted of a picture of an 
object to be matched in a circle in the center of a larger 
circle. Spaced around the smaller circle within the larger 
circle were six pictures of the same object, only one of which 
matched the details of the picture in the inner circle. 
Measures of latency of the first response and the total number 
of errors were recorded. The median response latency was 
calculated. Those subjects above the median were classified 
as "reflective" and those below as "impulsive." The impulsive 
subjects made more errors.
lehtifi (1970) investigated the order of the importance 
of clues in the formulation of hypotheses. The stimuli were 
Ektachrome color slides of 72 combinations of numbers in two 
sises (small and large) and two colors (red and blue) with one 
dot or two dots at the end of each target row. The elides 
were projected <mto a rear-projection screen with an Agfa 
Diamator 150 projector. For each exposure, the examiner 
pushed the start buttm of an electronic timer, the sdendd- 
operated shutter opened and the timer started. The correct 
choice by the subject was to press the left kqr if there was
15
one dot at the end of the target row and the right key if 
there were two dots* When the subject pushed either of the 
keys* the shutter closed and the timer recorded the time.
Feedback for the subject was provided lAen he heard the 
examiner read aloud the recorded time to a tape recorder.
Three problems were presented using six subjects for eadx 
problem. The target for the il»t problem was red* small* 
digit "3"* The second problaa separated the multiple attribute 
target into the single attributes of red* small* and digit "3"*
The third problem was the same as the second using six new 
subjects. No information about the subjects was given.
The time and number of errors were recorded for each subject.
The order of analysis of the clues presented was color* sise* 
and then shape.
Mases usually consist of several points at which two 
or three choices are available. Selection of the correct 
path at each point results in reaching the goal or the end of 
the mase. Early studies using children include the ball rolling 
maze by Mattsm (1933), the finger-maze by Wieg (1932), the 
stylus^ mase by McGinnis (1929) and the boc^ -maze by Wenger (1933) «
Various results were reported by other maze studies as 
follows: adults slightly better thw children and children 
subtly better than rats by Hicks and Carr (1912), only a 
slight difference between children of age 11 and adults of 
age 21 in a stylus-maze by Gould and Perrin (1916), university 
students sli^tly better than rats by Husband (1929), and a 
low correlation between intelligenee test scores and maze
16
performance of psychology students in an electrical type maze 
by Luidey (1931). Mattson (1933) using maze learning found 
the learning curve for boys and girls almost identical.
McGinnis (1929) found bpys initially ahead of the girls, 
who soon equaled their skill. Thus the girls made greater 
absolute gains during the test than the boys.
Visual apprehension was investigated by De Santis (1931) 
using 9 normal children from 3 to 6 years of age, 9 feeble­
minded from 7 to 12, 10 imbeciles, 1 idiot, and 1 moron. He 
reported that the feeble-minded were slower but even down to 
the idiot level, some spatial data was learned. The slowness 
was probably due to poor attentive capacity.
Gellerman (1931) compared 38 children ranging in age 
from 3 to 13 years and 25 college students using a large body- 
size temporal alley maze. Whenever an incorrect turn was made, 
a door blocked further progress so the subject had to go back 
and make the correct move. Three correct trials in succession 
were required. For children the solution was twice right, 
then twice left; for adults, it was the same sequence plus one 
repetition. The children required more than two and a half 
times as many trials as the adults. The average number of er­
rors was 30 for children and 16 for adults. Two children 
ages three and four failed to solve the problem. Beyond the 
age of four there was a gradual decrease in the number of 
trials required. For adults there was a corr^ation of ,58 
between intelligence score and number of trials to learn 
and similarly high between accuracy and intelligence.
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Haier (1936) used a swastika-shaped maze through idiich 
the children walked. There was a goal booth at the end of each 
of the four pathways, any one could be reached from the others, 
but only one contained a toy house. The subjects were 38 
children in 5 successive age groups, the youngest age group 
averaged k years. All of the children in the four-year group 
failed and the average five-year-old group did not do much 
better. It was not until the age of six that accuracy signi­
ficantly exceeded chance. Maier (1936) concluded that the 
average child below the age of six had not acquired the ability 
to combine experiences required by his test. Performance im­
proved with both C.A, and M.A. but was not significant until 
a C.A. of six or a M.A. of six.
Httssen (196O) points out that most studies in concept 
formation have been to determine the concepts subjects have 
already acquired at different ages rather than testing to 
determine the original learning from, concept teaching. He 
uses the terms "concept learning" and "concept discovery."
He suggests that clear-cut studies of concept learning are rare 
in the literature, a systematic stucÿ has scarely begun.
Peterson (1918) used the association of a number with 
a letter in a study of rational learning. Psychology students 
who were the subjects had to guess at the number associated 
with each letter until they had learned the whole series.
The test scores obtained in this investigation correlated 
highly with estimates of intelligence and with class standing 
in psychology.
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One of the few systematic investigations of concept 
learning in adults was done hy Hull (1920). He used Chinese 
characters, unfamiliar to his subjects, in complex stimulus 
patterns as a measure of the evolution of concepts. Improve­
ment with age was found. He suggested that the selection of 
a common identical element may not necessarily involve the 
same function as the arriving at an abstraction from symbols 
where the common element is a broad term.
Vickers and Hoskins (1929) used an obstacle test, 
inverse form board, area sorting, substitution, and card 
sorting according to geometrical design with groups of 
children and adults. These tests, thought to measure intel­
lectual ability in a practical situation, showed a steady 
increase in solutions with increase in age.
Hazlitt (1929) used two problems, the sorting of 
small and large black cards and assembling the Russian egg 
after instruction. The subjects were told to replace all 
of the smaller eggs within the larger egg except the green 
one. The subjects were from three to seven years of age.
The results suggest that regardless of chronological age, 
mental age, or relative brightness, the reasoning process 
is essentially the same when the experience factor is elimi­
nated and all of the data is within the understanding of the 
subject. This is another way of saying that if the problem 
is simple enough, all subjects, dull or bright and younger 
or older, will not be different in their solutions.
The formation of coicepts through learning to
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associate nonsense syllables with symbols such as a circle and 
two dots was investigated by Smoke (1932), Twenty psychology 
students were the subjects. A positive correlation between 
the ability to learn the concepts rapidly and high intelli­
gence was reported.
Ray (1936) used an apparatus that automatically 
presented a new pair of pictures after each choice was made 
by pressing a key under either of the two pictures. A green 
light would flash with a correct choice and a red light when 
incorrect. The 20 series of pictures consisted of compete 
versus incomplete objects, curvilinear versus non-curvilinear 
objects, and animate versus inanimate objects. The subjects 
were twelve year old children, six dull, six normal, and six 
bright. The brights solved more problems using fewer hypotheses, 
but the number of hypotheses tested, correlated negatively with 
intelligence. Ray (1936) points out that the perception of 
a great variety of clues to generate a larger number of 
hypotheses was not necessarily a sign of int^igence. The 
generation of fewer hypotheses relevant to the data may be 
a sign of intelligence as suggested by the negative corre­
lation. The use of irrelevant clues and perseveratim of hypoth­
eses were common to the dull and average but not among the 
bright. Verbalisation of the correct solution was more fre­
quent ammg the bright than the dull subjects.
Blake and Williams (1963) used a paired-assooiates 
problem to compare groups of retarded, I.Q. ?8; normal, I.Q. 
95-99; and superior, I.Q. 132-136, students selected from the
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public schools. Each group was subdivided into two sets, one 
set was equated by M.A., the other set by C.A. The paired- 
associates test consisted of four object-level words and 
two-digit numerals as labels as follows: mammals 47, 
flowers 91» trees 28, and weather 75. Testing was preceded 
by a training phase. Four to 10 subjects were tested in 
groups composed of subjects from each I.Q. level. The 
findings were that the groups equated by M.A. were not sig­
nificantly different in level of concept attainment. For 
the groups equated by C.A., the superior group performed 
significantly better than the normal and the normal group 
significantly better than the retarded.
Three studies comparing normal to subnormal bpys using 
the same materials were performed by Stephens (1964, 1966, 
1968). A series of 2? cards were constructed, 2 saaq&Le cards 
and 25 test cards. Each card was 8 inches by 18 inches with 
seven pictures on each. Four of the pictures were represen­
tative of a given test category (e.g. color, form, detail, sex, 
age, odd vs. even, number of dots, etc.) and three were not. 
The subject was required to place a marker on each of the 
four pictures selected as being alike and then to state in his 
own words the characteristic common to his choices.
For the first study, Stephwis (1964) compared 30 
normal with 30 sutoormal children attending urban public 
schools in central Oklahemia. The subjects were placed into 
groups according to chronological age and intelligence test 
scores. Ten normals and lO subnormals were in each age
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group; 7-6 to 8-5, 8-6 to 9-5» and 9-6 to 10-6. On an intelli­
gence test the normals scored between 96 and IO8 with a mean 
of 101 and the subnormals scored between 4? and 72 with a mean 
of 60. Each subject was given the two sample cards and helped 
to solve these examples. Then each of the 25 test cards were 
presented, the examiner naming the appropriate category for 
each card, and then the subject placed markers on the four 
items appropriate to the category. In fourteen of the 25 
categories tested, the number of normal subjects attaining 
the correct solution was significantly greater than the num­
ber of subnormals. It was concluded that the normal group 
made significantly more correct responses than the subnormal 
group. Stephens (1964) pointed out that the subnormals ex­
hibited a smaller repertory of categories indicating that 
they could be expected to perform at a lower level even vhen 
the cues were strong and relevant to the appropriate category.
For the second study, Stephens (1966) used the same 
boys in the same groups and the same technique that he used 
in his former study in 1964, The results of two problems 
were considered. For the first problem, each subject was re­
quired to place the markers on his four choices and then to 
state in what way he believed the items he had chosen to be 
alike. The subject was not told idiether his choice was cor­
rect or incorrect. The cards were presented again to the 
same subjects for the second problem, the examiner stating 
the name of each category as the card was shown, requiring the 
subject to place the markers again. The results of this
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problem were reported previously ty Stephens (1964), It was 
found that the number of correct responses attained ly the 
normal group was significantly greater than for the subnormal 
group and the number of correct category verbalizations hy the 
normal group was significantly greater than for the subnormal 
group. Ste^ Aens (1966) pointed out that even though the sub­
normal subjects were able to use the proper category for 
grouping the test items, these subjects had great difficulty 
in specifying the name of that categoxy. This restricted use 
of functional categories may suggest that the subnormal is less 
able to comprehend and interpret a wide range of stimuli found 
in everyday experiences.
The third comparative study was concerned with the 
types of errors exhibited by the normal and subnormal subjects 
in their efforts to verbalize the correct conceptual categories 
which they had used correctly in a problem solving situation.
The results of the unstructured problem were reported by 
Stephens (1966) and of the structured problem by Stephens (1964). 
The recorded verbalization errors were organized into seven 
categories: over-generalization, under-generalization, incor­
rect generalizatim, enumeration of names, enumeration of 
functions, similarity statement, and no-knowledge. The no­
knowledge errors were considered to be at the lowest level of 
conceptualization. The generalization errors of the normal 
subjects comprised 92.361$ of the total errors and only 50.44$ 
for the subnormals. Consequently, the remaining six categories 
were then combined, resulting in only two classifications.
23
errors of generaliztion and errors of non-generalization. 
Stephens (1968) pointed out that the findings indicated that 
the subnormals were equally likely to commit both types of 
errors, generalization and non-generalization, while the nor­
mals were more likely to attempt to generalize and thus to 
make more errors. The retarded subjects produced fewer verbal 
responses and said "I don't know" more often which was inter­
preted as expressing no knowledge of the categories even 
though they had been able to use the concept successfully. 
Their verbal responses, even though fewer, tended to be low 
level descriptions of appearance or function rather than a 
relevant category description.
Various kinds of mechanical puzzles have been used in 
experiments on problem solving in bright and dull children.
The child must make effective use of sticks or other potential 
implements in order to reach a lure.
Ruger (1910) used puzzles that required the separation 
of such things as rings from each other. When the subject 
failed to perceive the logical solution, trial and error 
behavior was evident.
Eagleson (19^ ) used various match stick problems and 
mystery type puzzles in a study using 33 negro subjects. He 
found a higher correlation between the time required to solve 
the puzzles and the number of overt manipulations than between 
the time required and intelligence. No clear-cut differences 
between the bright and dull were noted.
An instrumentation problem similar to the kind
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Kohler (1925) used with chimpanzees was used Alpert (1928) 
with 44 nursery school children. For one problem, an object 
was suspended from the ceiling that could be obtained by 
placing a nearby block underneath and standing upon it. In 
another problem, an attractive toy was placed too far from 
bars of the pen to be reached with the hand, A stick was 
lying within the pen that could be used to poke through the 
bars to pull in the toy. In another situation, the toy was 
placed farther from the bars and two halves of a fishing rod 
were lying inside the pen. The two halves could be fitted 
together to be of sufficient length to reach the toy and pull 
it in. Three types of insight were reported; solution with 
immediate insight, solution with partial insight, and solution 
with sudden insight,
Matheson (1931) performed an extensive investigation 
of instrumentation using 28 children between the ages of 2 
and 4i years. Some of the problems were: to get a lure by 
unhooking a ring to lower a basket, stack boxes in order to 
reach a high lure, and one of several crossed strings attached 
to a lure. Much of the activity was characterized as trial 
and error, A low positive correlation was found between 
chronological age and solution of problems and between intel­
ligence and solution of problems.
Syllogistic reasoning, involving only the deductive 
process, was investigated by Winch (1921, 1922), Wilkins (1928), 
Moore (1929)# Ewert and Lambert (1932), I^ le (1935)# and Sells 
(1936). The findings reported were: steady improvement with
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age, low positive to .71 positive correlations with I.Q. 
scores, highly correlated with school success, and high 
correlation between generalizing and intelligence.
Broady (i940) set up comparable tests of verbal and 
nonverbal reasoning of concrete classification and abstract 
classification. All four types developed as a function of 
increasing chronological age except for nonverbal abstract 
in which no further developnent was found after the age of 
174 months. The development sequence was: verbal concrete, 
nonverbal concrete, nonverbal abstract, and verbal abstract.
Various other types of problem solving techniques 
were used in making comparisons of performance with intel­
ligence. Harter (1930) reported a low positive correlation. 
Bedell (1934) found that those subjects in the lower quartile 
in intelligence scored little better than chance on an infer­
ence test, Billings (1934) reported moderate correlations 
with various academic fields. Roslow (1936) found correlations 
from .32 to .8i, and Graham (1938) found success, tracing 
geometric figures without lifting the pencil, eight times as 
great for those in the upper decile as compared with those in 
the lower decile.
Sargent (19^) attempted to investigate the thinking 
process, both quantitatively and qualitatively by using ana­
grams. He found that the correlation between levels of I.Q. 
decreased as the level of difficulty increased. The solving 
of easy anagrams was facilitated most by speed of reorganization 
and reaction to clues. The more difficult ones were facilitated
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by richness of hypotheses, overcoming of interference, and an 
analysis based on experience. An individual not being profi­
cient in both aspects would account for the decrease in corre­
lation as the difficulty of the anagrams increased.
Stevenson (1968) investigated the performance of 258 
bpys and 271 girls on an anagram task. Instructions to make 
as maiy words as possible in eight minutes from the letters 
contained in the word "generation" were presented by a pro­
fessional television announcer on television film. The sub­
jects were public school students in grades 3-9 present in 
19 classrooms in middle-class sections of Minneapolis, I,Q, 
and C,A. were obtained for each grade and each sex. Additional 
available data on 32 retarded boys and 32 retarded girls of 
the same C.A. as the normal subjects in grades 7,8, and 9 
whose average M.A. was comparable to the M.A. of the normal 
subjects in grade 4 was recorded. It was found that: girls 
performed significantly better than boys in all grades, con­
sistent increases occurred at each higher grade level and 
higher intellectual level within each grade, and anagrams 
are a productive and efficient means of investigating devel­
opmental change in the verbal processes of children. The 
retarded subjects constructed approximately the same number 
of words as their M.A, peers in the fourth grade but 27^  of 
the words were not appropriate, nonsense words being more 
prevalent,
Lipton and Overton (1971) investigated the perfor­
mance of 80 grammar school children in grades 2, 4, 6, and 8
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on an anagram task consisting of scrambled words printed in 
two inch high block letters. The subjects in each grade were 
subdivided into high and low reading achievement groups. Each 
subject was required to print the word after saying it aloud. 
The time between the presentation of the card and the verbal 
reply was recorded. There was a significant improvement in 
performance by grade level and by reading ability level within 
each grade. Word length was found to have a significant ef­
fect on both the number of solutions and solution time. The 
greatest improvement in performance occurred between the 
second-and fourth grade groups.
After a review of the methods and devices used, Teska 
(19^ 2) concluded, "None of these tests provided an opportunity 
for the exercise of all the elements of the problem-solving 
process. The mazes and puzzles are weak as tests of problem 
solving because the data do not yield to inductive reasoning. 
The tests of syllogistic reasoning emphasize the deductive 
element to the exclusion of the inductive element. The tests 
of concept formation, while well balanced as problem solving 
tests within the confines of a given age level, are limited 
because it is difficult to develop a list of concepts common 
to both younger and older subjects not too difficult or com­
plex for the younger or too simple for older subjects. The 
multiple-choice technique is adapted to testing over a wide 
age range. The generalizations necessaiy for the solution 
arise logically from the data— that is, inductively— and can 
be checked systematically against the data— that is, deduc­
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tively— and at the same time can be stated with clarity in the 
language of the very young subject. The data is such that the 
older or brighter subjects can extract more meaning frm it. 
The type of clues provided by the Yerkes* multiple choice is 
limited to clues of position and relationship. This limita­
tion is a definite weakness of the test, A test providing a 
wider variety of clues, thus giving greater range to inductive 
processes but still retaining the systematic means of checking 
hypotheses, should be a more adequate test of the problem­
solving process" [pp, 26-2?].
After a review of the current literature to include 
the techniques used, the writer agrees with the conclusions 
of Teska (19^ 2), The Problem Box incoporates all of the 
better ideas found in the literature, LehtiB (1970) projected 
color slides of large and small numbers in red or blue on a 
rear-projection screen and incoporated a time recording device. 
The examiner pushed a start button to open the shutter for 
each trial and the subject pressed either a right hand or left 
hand key that closed the shutter. The feedback to the subject 
was delayed and verbal. House and Zeaman (1958)» Harter 
(1965, 1967), and Moffitt (1969) used an apparatus that was 
not portable. Reinforcement was provided by candy or a marble 
as a reward for a correct response which is a form of external 
motivation as well, Gerjupy (1953) provided feedback by 
turning out one of three lights when the correct button was 
pressed, Mussen (196O) pointed out that pushing a button is 
a clear-cut discrete response which makes observation and
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recording easy. Push buttons were used by Gerjuoy (1953)i 
Jeffrey (1958), and Terrell and Kennedy (1957). Multiple- 
choice was concluded to be quite easy for preschool children 
when used by Kuenne (19^) and Stevenson and Zigler (1958). 
Gerjupy (1953), Cantor (1955), and Norcross (1958) demon­
strated conclusively that the ability to learn names for the 
stimuli plays an important role in solving discrimination 
problems. Mussen (i960) pointed out that the difficulty of 
a problem can be changed by varying the number of stimuli with 
the number of choices held constant, by varying the number of 
response choices with the number of stimuli held constant, or 
by varying the number of stimuli and response choices. These 
variations can be provided for using the Problem Box by re­
arranging the order of the slides in the carousel of the pro­
jector, The Problem Box was used successfully by Pepper (1966) 
to investigate verbalisation in problem solving and by Teska 
(19^ 2), Hensley (1957), and Heath (1970) in comparative studies 
of the problem solving performances of children,
Teska (19^ 2) designed and built the Problem Box for the 
purpose of providing a means of investigating independently or 
as a group, all of the five elements of the problem solving 
process discussed previously. The Problem Box was then used 
by Teska (19^ 2) in order to verify the adequacy of it in pro­
viding a means of determining the step in the problem solving 
process in which success or failure had occurred and in order 
to use the data provided by the Problem Box to ccmpare the 
performances of 3^  dull and bright subjects of different
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chronological ages. Ten problems were used with a maximum of 
100 trials permitted per problem. After an analysis of the 
data obtained as a result of the testing procedures used with 
the Problem Box, Teska (l9kZ) stated, "The test provided 
several means of determining to what elements in the problem, 
solving process success or failure could be traced" [p. 4^.
It was further concluded, "The test was successful in revealing 
the differences in the performance of dull and bright children. 
It was possible to trace success or failure to particular 
steps in the problem-solving process. Acquired concomitants 
of intelligence such as good reading ability and rich vocabu­
lary played a small role in success or failure. The test is 
adapted to use over a wide age range" [p. 52], After a com­
parison of the performances of the 3^  subjects, it was found 
that the percentage of solutions increased at each successive 
age level for both the bright and dull. The youngest of the 
bright, C,A. 8, was superior to the oldest of the dull, C,A* l4. 
The bright were superior to the dull in the number of problems 
solved and in the number of trials required for solution. In 
comparing the bright with the dull having the same M,A,, the 
bright were superior to the dull in number of problems solved 
and the number of trials required for soluti<m. The predictive 
value for the degree of success in the problem solving situa­
tion used was greater than that of either M,A, or C,A, It 
was pointed out that the dull frequently solved problems with­
out verbal generalizations,
Hensley (1957) used the Problem Box to compare the
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problem solving ability of bright and dull children. Ten pro­
blems were used with a maximum of 100 trials permitted per 
problem. Thirty-seven subjects were placed in groups so that 
a comparison could be made between bright and dull having the 
same I.Q. with varying C.A. and M.A.. the same C.A. with 
varying M.A., and the same M.A. with varying C.A. and I.Q.
He concluded that at each age level the bright were superior 
to the dull in the number of problems solved and the number 
of trials. There was no appreciable difference between the 
younger bright and the older dull. The ability to solve pro­
blems was probably more a function of M.A. than of C.A. or I.Q. 
The bright were superior to the dull in frequency of verbal 
generalization at both age levels, apparently the chief point 
of differentiation.
Pepper (1966) used the Problem Box to investigate 
verbalization of problem solving behavior 3dien the examiner 
did or did not reinforce correct responses and when the problem 
was or was not stated by the examiner. One simple problem was 
used with a maximum of 60 trials for this problem. The sub­
jects were 66 volunteer undergraduate students at the University 
of Oklahoma. It was concluded that learning occurred more 
efficiently when the problem was stated and the reinforcement 
was clearly identified.
Heath (1970) remodeled the Problem Box because some of 
the electrical parts were no longer functional and were irre­
placeable as they were obsolete. The method of projecting the 
stimuli objects onto the translucent window was replaced with
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a Kodak Carousel 650 Automatic Focus slide projector. The 
four push buttons used by the subject to make his choice were 
replaced with toggle switches. The electrical system was re­
designed without the use of a response recording system. The 
basic ideas were retained including flexibility and portability. 
Heath (1970) used the Problem Box to compare the problem solving 
ability of average I.Q. children representative of a lower 
socio-economic white neighborhood, a lower socio-economic 
black neighborhood, and a higher socio-economie white neighbor­
hood. He used 10 problems with a maximum of 100 trials per 
problem. It was found that there were no significant differ­
ences in the problem solving ability between black and white 
subjects from similar socio-economie backgrounds nor any sig­
nificant differences between socio-economic levels as measured 
by the Problem Box, Problem solving ability increased as C.A. 
and M.A. increased. There were no significant differences 
between the mean number of trials used for solution and achieving 
verbal generalisation except for three problems solved by 
Group III. high socio-economic white. These three problems 
tended to be solved with fewer trials when correct verbal 
generalizations were not given.
Review of the Cognitive Growth of Children 
In designing a study to compare the problem solving 
ability of children, the age of the subjects was one of the 
variables to be considered. Problem solving is a complex 
process that evolves in relation to the developmental stages 
of intelligence as the child grows older.
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Piaget (1962) defined int^ligence in terms of operations, 
coordination of operations. He said, "I shall distinguish four 
great stages, or four great periods, in the development of in­
telligence: first, the sensori-notor period before the appear­
ance of language; second, the period fVom about two to seven 
years of age, the preoperational period which precedes real 
operations; third, the period from seven to twelve years of age, 
a period of concrete operations (vAiich refers to concrete ob­
jects) ; and finally after twelve years of age, the period of 
formal operations, or positional operations" [p. 121], About 
the period from seven to twelve years of age he observed, "At 
this stage the child is still reasoning on the basis of idiat 
he sees because there is no conservation. He is able to mas­
ter this problem only when the operations are formed and these 
operations, lAich we have already sensed at the sensori-notor 
level, are not formed until around seven to eight years of age.
At that age the elementary problems of conservation are solved, 
because the child reasons on the basis of the transformation 
per se, and this requires a manipulation of the operation.
The ability to pass from one stage to the other and be able to 
come back to the point of departure, to manipulate the revers­
ible operations, which appears around seven to eight years of 
age, is limited when compared with the operations of the su­
perior level only in the sense that thqr are concrete. That 
is to say, the child can manipulate the operations only when 
he manipulates the object concretely" [p. 125Q, "It is only 
around seven to eight years of age that a child is capable of
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solving a problem of inclusion. Another system of operation 
that appears around seven to eight years of age is the oper­
ation of serializing; that is, to arrange objects according 
to their size, or their progressive weight. It is also a 
structure of the whole, like the olassifioatiwi which rests 
on cMicrete operations, since it consists of manipulating con­
crete objects" [p. 126].
Piaget (1964) wrote, "...the child of seven or eight 
thinks before acting and thus begins to ccmquer the difficult 
process of reflection” [p. 4(Q. "Intuition is the highest form 
of equilibrium attained ly the thinking of young children and, 
in this sense, corresponds to the cwcrete operation thinking 
of middle childhood" [p. 48]. "At around seven to eight years, 
on the average (needless to say, these average ages are depen­
dent on the social and educational environment), the child- 
after interesting transition ^ diases whose details we shall not 
discuss here— arrives at the constitution of a logic and of 
operational structures which we shall call "cwcrete," This 
"concrete" stage, as opposed to formal characteristics of true 
logic, is particularly instructive for the psychology of logi­
cal operations in general. It signifies that at this level, 
the level of the beginnings of logic proper, the operations 
are not as yet concerned with propositions or verbal declara­
tions but with objects themselves and are confined to classi­
fying, seriating, putting in correspondence with one an­
other,..." [p. 12^.
Piaget (1928) observed, "...it is no exaggeratiw in
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this sense to say that there is no logical reasoning before the 
age of 7-8, , , , For by the term 'reas(ming' should be under­
stood the work of controlling and proving hypotheses, idiich 
work alone creates conscious implications among judgements" [p. •
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) stated, "In contrast, stage 
III subjects view the experiment from the start both in terms 
of the total number of possibilities and in terms of necessary 
relations, since they possess operations which both are 
combinatorial and contain the potential assurance of deductive 
necessity. In their first correspondence operations they do 
not merely take note of the empirical relationships but im­
mediately proceed to search for an explanation— i.e., they 
consider the correspondences as implications" [p. 1"Q. "Thus, 
generally, verification at stage III consists of two procedures:
(l) separating out variables according to combinatiws not 
glvmby direct observation, and (2) the composition of these 
relationships according to operations of conjunction and im­
plication such as those of proposition. . . •" [p. 4$].
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) observed, "The third stage 
(starting at 7-8 years) is marked ly a new type of anticipation, 
one that refers to transformations as opposed to static col­
lections, as well as showing an understanding of inclusion.
The schema of inclusion may begin as a mere form in search of 
content. This is what happens when the very diversity of pos­
sible criteria makes it difficult for the subject to decide on 
his first classification without trial-and-error. Alongside 
this development in anticipation, we find a correspondingly
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greater flexibility in changing criteria: sometimes an alter­
native criterion is-sdopted immediately, lAile at others the 
new classification may be preceded by trial-and-error, but 
even the trial-and-error shows that the subject is aware of 
the different possibilities. • • [p. 22l] •
Guilford (1952) after reviewing tests composed of 
syllogisms found that the results usually show that there is 
a marked spurt in the development of logical powers at about 
the ages of seven to eight. Even though many examples of 
spontaneous reasoning in children appear below the age of six, 
they rarAy do well in standard tests of the syllogistic type.
Gattell (1963) isolated "fluid" and "crystallised" 
components of intelligence. The "crystallized" factor cm- 
sists largely of "process" fhnctions, presumably not much in­
fluenced by learning or educational experience, and reaches 
maturity at a relatively early age.
Ausubel (1968) found evidence in various studies that 
bright, dull, and average children grow intelleetually at 
different rates. The terminal age of intelleotual growth was 
the same for all levels, but the dull attain a much larger 
percentage of their ultimate intellectual status during the 
early years and tend to grow in spurts and pauses. Normal 
children grow at a more constant rate and the bright grow at 
an accelerated rate in later childhood that slows down in 
middle and late adolescence.
Haler (1936) in a prolJLen where subjects had to put 
"two and two together" found that not until the average age
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of six was accuracy far better than chance. Harter (1930) in 
a pencil-maze problem found fewer inappropriate moves as age 
increased from three to six, no errorless solutions occurred 
below the age of five. Gelleraan (1931) in a previously dis­
cussed study, found that beyond the age of four years there 
was a gradual decrease in the number of trials required for 
learning at successive age levels. Braine (1959) in a study 
repeating two of Piaget's logical operations studies found 
logical operations concepts evident in children at the age 
of 5, two years younger than Piaget had found. Bloom (1964) 
after several actensive studies of development concluded that 
in terms of intelligence measured at age 17, at least 20^  is 
developed by age 1, 505^ by about age 4, 80^  by about age 8, 
and 92^  at age 13.
Thurstone and Aekerson (1929) reported the inflection 
point of the mental growth curve to have a positive accelera­
tion up to the age of about 10 with an inflection point some­
where near the age of 11. Thqy suggest that mental growth 
curves have initial positive acceleraticai, an inflection point, 
and a later negative acceleration for all children, the in- 
flectim point coming earlier for the bright than for the dull.
In reviewing the literature discussed above, it was 
reported that children could solve non-verbal problems as 
young as 4 or 5» at that age children below I.Q. 70 would 
have such a low M.A. that they would not be able to perform 
adequately in a problem solving situation. Piaget (1962) 
described the period up to 12 years of age as the concrete
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operations stage and Thurstone and Aekerson (1929) found the 
mental growth curve to have positive acceleration up to about 
the age of 10 with an inflection point at about the age of 11. 
The median age between 5 and 11 or 12 would be more appropriate 
and since children at the age of 8 were reported by Bloom (1964) 
to have acquired about 805& of their intelligence, the writer con­
cluded that children at the chronological age of 8 would be most 
appropriate for a study of non-verbal problem solving.
Statement of the Problem 
There were two purposes of this study. The first was 
to compare the problem solving ability as measured by the 
Problem Box of three groups of eight-year-old children; very 
bright, average, and high-grade mentally defective, as measured 
by the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (196O). The second 
purpose was to find out whether a relationship existed between 
the total number of trials used in the attempt to solve the 
problems and the total number of problems solved by all subjects 
as measured by the Problem Box.
Definitions
The following operational definitions were used for 
this study;
Problem Solving Ability; measured by recording for 
each subject; the number of trials used in the 
attempt to solve the 10 problems, the number of pro­
blems solved, and the number of problems solved 
with a correct verbalization of the solution.
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Solution of the Problem: recognised two criteria 
as a solution; one vas 10 consecutive correct 
responses indicated by 10 consecutive red lights, 
and the other vas a correct verbalisatim of the 
generalisation regardless of number of correct trials*
Problem Box: used in this study means the Problem 
Box designed by Teska (1942), remedied by Heath 
( 1970), and improved by the vriter.
Group I; the bright group, means the idiite eight- 
year-old children vho scored 130 or above on the 
short form of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence 
Scale (I960).
Group II; the average group, means the vfaite eight- 
year-old children idio scored betveen 90 and 110 
on the short form of the Stanford-Binet Intelli­
gence Scale (i960).
Group III; the high grade mentally defective group, 
means the \diite eight-year-old children vho scored 
betveen 55 and 70 on the short fora of the Stanford- 
Binet Intelligence Scale (i960).
Limitations
This study vas limited to vhite ei^t-year-old (t three 
months) children attending the public schools in the vicinity 
of Norman, Oklahoma, vho scored betveen 55 ond 70, 90 and 110, 
and 130 or above on the short fora of the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale (196O). Parental consent vas obtained.
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Hypotheses
The following null hypotheses were tested for statis­
tical significance at the ,05 level by the Mann-VMtney U Test 
(Siegel, 1956) using Table K and the Spearman Rank Corrri.ation 
Coefficient (Siegel, 1956).
1) There is no statistically significant difference 
in the problem solving ability between; Group I and Group II, 
Group I and Group III, and Group II and Group III as measured 
by the total number of trials required in the attempt to solve 
the ten problems by use of the Problem Box.
2) There is no statistically significant difference 
in the problem solving ability between; Group I and Group II, 
Group I and Group III, and Group II and Group III as measured 
by the number of problems solved by use of the Problem Box,
3) There is no statistically significant difference 
in the number of correct verbalizations of the correct solution 
of the problems solved between; Group I and Group II, Group I 
and Group III, and Group II and Group III,
4) There is no statistically significant corre­
lation between the number of trials used by all subjects in 
attempting to solve the ten problems and the number of pro­
blems solved by all subjects as measured Iqr the Problem Box.
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND DESIGN
Selection of Subjects 
White children having a chronological age of eight 
years (i three months) attending the public schools in the 
vicinity of Norman, Oklahoma, were selected. Test scores on 
file were used as a pre-screening method to identify those 
children who would be most likely to score within the range 
of the prescribed groups. The short form of the Stanford- 
Binet Intelligence Scale (i960) was individually administered 
to all of the subjects by the same examiner idio was eligible 
for certification by the State of Oklahoma as a psychometrist. 
Those children who scored 130 or above, between 90 and 110, and 
between 55 and 70 were placed in the appropriate group and 
tested individually with the Problem Box. The writer adminis­
tered all of the individual tests on the Problem Box. Table 1 
is a description of the subjects and results of the testing.
Description of the Problem Box 
The Problem Box designed by Teska (19^ 2) and remodeled by 
Heath (1970) was improved and altered by the writer as follows:
1) The tog^e switches were replaced with push- 
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button double-throw switches. The push buttons are a little 
over one-half inch in diameter, molded out of pale red plastic.
2) The viewing screen made of fposted glass was re­
placed with a Kodak rear-view screen about 4 inches by 4 inches
in size that produced more distinct images with more uniform cdLor,
3) The color slides were replaced with Kodacolor II 
color pictures taken with a 35 mm, single reflex camera of a 
square and a triangle made of white, dark green, or bright red 
photographic paper placed in the various positions on a black 
background, A jig for this purpose was made by a person 
skilled in mechanical drawing. The new slides produced more 
uniform positioning of the square and the triangle on the rear­
view screen, more unifom color of better quality, and a more 
uniform distribution of light,
4) The angle of the face of the Problem Box was 
changed so that the screen was held paralld to the lens of 
the projector providing a more uniform distribution of light,
5) The delay between the time the subject pushed 
a button and when the slide changed was shortened ffom five 
seconds to three seconds. It seemed that the shorter delay 
might eliminate some probable boredm possibly felt by the 
subject,
6) The maximum number of trials permitted each sub­
ject in attempting to solve a problem was changed from 100 to 
64, It seemed that 100 trials was excessive because mapy of 
the children who solved a small number of problems would ex­
perience too much failure. After examining the data of
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Hensley (1957) and Heath (1970), the writer decided that a 
maximum of 64 trials permitted per problem would be more 
appropriate and would not appreciably change the total number 
of problems solved.
The Problem Box, made of l/4 inch plywood, is 10 inches 
high by 20 inches wide by 26 inches long and is open at the 
end opposite the screen. The box contains a 35 mm. Kodak 850 
Carousd Projector placed at the open end of the box opposite 
the screen. A Kodak rear-view screen approximately four inches 
square is centrally positioned in the face of the box with a 
red light centered above it. There are four push buttons, one 
placed adjacent to each quadrant of the screen, any one of 
which when pushed will activate a 20-position variable (1-30 sec.) 
delayed-action relay switch. This delayed-action switch is 
pre-set at three seconds. After three seconds, it will acti­
vate the projector to automatically project the next slide 
onto the screen and to turn off the red light if it was on.
Only the correct button will turn the red light on. The pur­
pose of the three second delay is to provide the subject with 
an opportunity to review his choice. The box also contains 
various electrical panels. Three views and a schematic draw­
ing of the electrical system of the Problem Box are presented 
in Figures 1,2,3, and 4 in the Appendix.
The slides used in the Problem Box consisted of a 
series of pictures of a square and a triangle in eight dif­
ferent positions and in varying combinations of colors; red, 
white, and green. Twelve different positions of the square
44
and triangle were possible but the four in lAiich both figures 
appear together on the right or the left were excluded. Each 
carousel contained 80 slides placed in the desired sequence, 
the first 10 slides having the figures in varying positions and 
colors, the other 70 slides a continuous duplication of the 
first 10. Four carousels were used. One carousel contained 
slides of both figures in idiite used for problem one, two, and 
three. The second carousel contained slides of one white figure 
and the other figure green used for problem four. The third 
carousel contained slides of both figures red or both figures 
green used for problems five, eight, nine, and ten. The fourth 
carousel contained slides of one figure in red and the other 
in green used for problems six and seven.
The order of presentation of the ten problems, easiest to 
most difficult, was determined ly Teska (1942) in his pilot study, 
verified by his final test, and used by Heath (1970). These
problems in the same order were used in this stucÿ as follows:
1. Always the square (demonstration).
2. Always the triangle.
3. Always the figure on the left.
4. Always the green figure.
5. Triangle when both figures are red, square 
Tdien both figures are green.
6. Always the figure on the right, but in each 
trial one figure is red and the other is green.
Color is a false clue.
7. Red-green alternation, regardless of figwe.
8. Square when both figures are red, triangle when 
both figures are green.
9. Single alternation of the figures, figures appearing 
both red or both green. Color is a false clue.
10. Square when the figures are in opposite comers, 
trtangle when the figures are in adjacent comers, 
the figures appearing both red or both green.
Color is a false clue.
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Test Procedure
The Problem Box vas placed on a table in a suitable 
position for the subject. The appropriate carousel vas placed 
in the projector, the Problem Box vas turned on and the first 
slide of the problem vas projected onto the screen. The sub­
ject vas seated in front of the Problem Box in a comfortable 
position and the examiner vas seated in back of the subject 
vhere he could observe vhich button the subject pushed and 
vhether or not the red light flashed on vhen the subject 
pushed a button. The examiner recorded each response, vhether 
correct or incorrect, on a scoring sheet illustrated in 
Figure 5 of the Appendix.
All subjects vere given these instructions on the first 
problem (sily: "One of these four buttons (pointing out the 
four buttons) vill cause this light (pointing to the light) 
to flash red." The examiner then pressed the button beside 
the square and the red light came on. "Remember only csie of 
these four buttons vill cause the light to flash." The exam­
iner again pressed the button beside the square and the red 
light came on. "The idea is to make the light flash red 
every time." The examiner again pressed the button beside the 
square and the light came on. Usually the subject began to 
push the buttons but occasionally it vas necessary to say to 
the subject, "You do it nov." No further demonstration trials 
vere given until the subject had used 64 trials and bad not 
solved the first problem. After getting the red light in a 
fev consecutive trials, some of the subjects vould generalize
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the solution Iqr such statements as; "It's the square," "This 
is easy," or "I think I knov," If the subject did not verbal­
ize the solution vfûuntarily after ten consecutive red lights, 
considered a solution to the problem, he vas asked, "You have 
been getting the light to flash evexy time. Hov do you do 
it?" If no response, he vas questioned further, "Hov do you 
tell vhich button to push next?" On the first problem only, 
if the subject did not solve it and verbalize the solution, 
a demonstration vas given until he understood the solution.
He vas then encouraged to push the buttons until he flashed 
the red light every time and vas able to verbalize the solu­
tion. This gave the subject a "success experience" and 
encouraged him to continue vith the other problems. A maxi­
mum of 64 trials vas permitted for each problem. A problem 
vas cmsidered solved vhen the subject voluntarily verbalized 
the correct solution or after ten consecutive red lights.
After the subject had attempted to solve all ten of 
the problems, he vas asked vhat he had "tried” in order to 
solve the problems. Most of the respoises vere "I forgot."
Others vere; "The triangle and the square," "The red wes and 
the green ones," or "This button, then this button, then 
this button, and this button (Pointing)." These responses 
and the generalizations verbalized during testing vere re­
corded on the scoring sheet. The number of trials used per 
problem, the total trials for all problems, the total number 
of problems solved, and the total number of problems solved and 
the solution verbalised are tabulated for each subject in Table 1.
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Statistical Analysis of the Data
The Maan-Whitney U Test was chosen to test Iqrpotheses 
one, two, and three because Siegel (1956) stated that it is 
one of the most powerful of the nonparametric tests for inde- 
nendent samples and unequal groups. It tests whether t#o 
independent groups have been drawn from the same population. 
The groups were unequal; Group I had l8 subjects. Group II had 
17, and Group III had 15. A parametric test could not be used 
because the assumptions of normality, hcmogeneity of variance, 
and continuous data with equal intervals could not be met.
The subjects were not selected at random from the population 
and the measurements were ordinal. The scores of the two 
groups to be compared were ranked together. Tied observations 
were assigned the average of the tied ranks. Correction for 
ties was not made since Siegel (1956) stated the test is more 
conservative when a correction for ties is not made. The 
formula method for determining the value of U was used as the 
groups were fairly large. Since the sise of the largest 
sample was larger than 9 and less than 20, Table K. in Siegel 
(1956) was used to find the critical value of Ü. If the ob­
served value was equal to or less than the critical value at 
the .05 level of significance, two-tailed test, the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
The Snearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was used to 
test hypothesis four. Siegel (1956) stated, "It is perhaps 
the best test known today" [p. 202]. Each of the three groups 
was tested for a relationship between the total number of
48
trials used in attempting to solve the ten problems and the 
number of problems solved. There was a large proportion of 
tied observations requiring the use of the formula provided 
for that purpose Siegel (1956) to find the observed value 
of rho. The critical value of rho at the .05 level, one- 
tailed test, was obtained fr<m Table P in Siegel (1956). If 
the observed value was equal to or greater than the critical 
value, the null Iqrpothesis was rejected.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Fifty white public school children eight years of age 
(i three months) were placed in appropriate groups in order 
to compare their non-language problem solving ability as 
measured by the Problem Box. Group I was composed of l8 very 
bright children who scored 130 or higher on the short form of 
the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (196O); Group II, 17 
average children who scored between 90 and 110; and Group III, 
15 mentally defective children who scored between 56 and 70,
A qualified psychometrist in the graduate school at the doc­
toral level at the University of Oklahcm administered all of 
the intelligence tests. The writer tested all of the children 
with the Problem Box, Two children were tested but excluded 
from the study because of apparent emotional problems. The 
description of the subjects and the results of testing are 
presented in tabular form in Table 1,
The Mann-Whitnev U Test was used to test at the ,05 
level (two-tailed) of significance, hypotheses numbered one, 
two, and three. All of these null hypotheses ware rejected at 
the ,002 level of significance, see Table 2,
Hypothesis 1, a comparison of the total number of
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trials required in the attempt to solve the ten problems, was 
tested. The results, presented in Table 2, were as follows:
1) Between Groups I and II, the observed value of 
U was 20.5. The critical value at the .05 level is 93 and at 
the .002 level (twt-tailed test), it is 6l. The observed value 
of Ü was less than the critical value at both levels of signi­
ficance so the null hypothesis was rejected at the .002 level. 
The bright group used significantly fewer trials than the 
average group.
2) Between Groups I and III, the observed value 
of U was 0. The critical value at the .05 level is 80 and at
the .002 level (two-tailed), it is 51 « The observed value of
U was less than the critical value at both levels so the null 
hypothesis was rejected at the .002 level. The bright group 
used significantly fewer trials than the mentally defective 
group.
3) Between Grpups II and III, the observed value 
of U was 4. The critical value at the .05 level is 75 and at
the .002 level it is 47. The observed value of U was less
than the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .002 level. The average group used sig­
nificantly fewer trials than the mentally defective group.
Hypothesis 2, a comparison of the total number of 
problems solved, was tested. The results, presented in Table 
2, were as follows:
l) Between Groups I and II, the observed value of 
U was 35.5. The critical value at the .05 level is 93 and at
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the ,002 level, it is 6l. The observed value of U was less 
than the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis 
vas rejected at the .002 level. The bright group solved sig­
nificantly more problems than the average group,
2) Between Groups I and III, the observed value of 
U vas 0, The critical value at the ,05 level is 80 and at the 
,002 level, it is 51* The observed value of U vas less than 
the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis was 
rejected at the ,002 level. The bright group solved signifi­
cantly more problems than the mentally defective group,
3) Between Groups II and III, the observed value 
of U was 2, The critical value at the ,05 level is 75 and at 
the ,002 level, it is 4?, The observed value of U was less 
than the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .002 level. The average group solved sig­
nificantly more problems than the mentally defective group.
Hypothesis 3* a comparison of the total number of 
problems solved and verbalized, vas tested. The results, pre­
sented in Table 2, vere as follows:
1) Between Groups I and II, the observed value of 
U vas 8, The critical value at the ,05 level is 93 and at 
the ,002 level, it is 6l, The observed value of U vas less 
than the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis 
vas rejected at the ,002 level. The bright group solved and 
verbalized significantly more problems than the average group,
2) Between Groups I and III, the observed value 
of U was 0, The critical value at the ,05 level is 80 and at
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the ,002 level it is 51. The observed value of U was less 
than the critical value at both levels so the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .002 level. The bright group solved and 
verbalized significantly more problems than the average group.
3) Between Groups II and III, the observed value 
of U was 5. The critical value at the ,05 level is 75 and 
at the ,002 level, it is 47. The observed value of U was 
less than the critical value at both levels so the null 
hypothesis was rejected at the ,002 level. The average 
group solved and verbalized significantly more problems 
than the mentally defective group.
To test hypothesis four, the significance of the 
correlation between the total number of trials used in 
attempting to solve the ten problems and the number of pro­
blems solved, the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was 
used, A significant positive correlation was found for all 
three groups at the ,01 level. This indicates that there is 
a positive relationship between the number of trials used and 
the number of problems solved. The results, presented in 
Table 2, were as follows:
l) For Group I, the obtained rho was ,76 for the 
l8 subjects. At the ,05 level of significance, the critical 
value is ,399 and ,564 at the ,01 level. The obtained rho was 
greater than the critical rho; therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the ,01 level, A highly significant positive 
correlation between the number of trials used and the number 
of problems solved was found for the tnlght group. This
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indicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
number of trials used and the number of problems solved.
2) For Group II, the obtained rho was ,71 for the 
17 subjects. The critical value at the .05 level is .402 and 
,583 at the .01 level (interpolated). The obtained rho was 
greater than the critical rho; therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .01 level. A highly significant positive 
correlation between the number of trials used and the number 
of problems solved was found for the average group. This in­
dicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
number of trials used and the number of problems solved.
3) For Group III, the obtained rho was .85 for 
the 15 subjects. The critical value of rho is .440 at the 
.05 level and .623 at the .01 level (interpolated). The ob­
tained rho was greater than the critical rho; therefore, the 
null Iqrpothesis was rejected at the .01 level. A highly sig­
nificant positive correlation between the number of trials 
used and the number of problems solved was found for the men­
tally defective group. This indicates that there is a posi­
tive relationship between the number of trials used and the 
number of problems solved.
TABLE 1
SUBJECT DATA AND RESULTS OF TESTING, GROUP I
Sub- ProbLem Numbers and Trials Total Total
jeot
No. C.A. I.Q. M.A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Total
Trials
Prob­
lems
Solved
Solved
and
Verbal­
ized
1 7-9 138 10-9 31 3 50 4 16 11 61 5 28* 64 273 9 8
2 8-0 130 10-6 10 7 53 7 6 24 64 8 39 64 282 8 8
3 8-2 130 10-9 64 4 64 4 13 43 29 12 12 64 309 7 7
4 8-1 144 11-9 64 10 64 14 6 64 15 10 20 50* 317 7 6
5 7-11 I4l 11-3 2 10 64 4 5 64 23 64 19 64 319 6 6
6 7-11 151 12-0 10 10 55 10 7 30 64 6 64 64 320 7 7
7 8-2 145 12-0 22 6 64 10 5 64 7 47 43 64 332 7 7
8 7-9 135 10-6 59 4 18 5 6 27 33 64 64 64 344 7 7
9 7-10 133 10-6 33 3 21 5 63 34 61 11 64 64 359 8 6
10 8-0 146 11-9 64 7 64 10 16 64 12 12 49 64 362 6 6
11 8-0 143 11-6 10 10 64 10 23 64 64 34 20 64 363 6 6
12 7-10 146 11-6 58 10 64 12 6 53 64 23 24 64 378 7 7
13 8-3 135 11-3 42 5 64 24 64 64 32 8 16 64 383 6 6
14 8-0 136 11-0 6 10 36 8 64 22 64 64 45 64 383 6 6
15 7-9 l4l 11-0 64 10 55 6 29 28 64 18 64 64 402 6 6
16 8-2 130 10-9 64 10 64 14 21 35 58 13 64 64 407 6 6
17 8-0 139 11-3 64 3 55 2 64 12 64 25 64 64 417 5 5
18 8-0 130 10-6 64 3 37 10 55 8 64 59 64 64 428 6 6
* solution not verbalised
TABLE 1— Continued
SUBJECT DATA AND RESULTS OF TESTING, GROUP II
Sub- Problem Numbers and Trials Total Total
ject
No. C.A. I.Q. M.A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Total
Trials
Prob­
lems
Solved
Solved
and
Verbal­
ised
19 7-10 110 8-9 30 10 38* 4 5 64 64 64 48 58* 378 7 5
20 7-9 98 7-9 18 10 60* 10 22 64 64 32 64 36 380 7 6
21 8-3 104 8-9 64 10 64 10 22 64 64 13 50 32* 393 6 5
22 8-2 96 8-0 64 5 64 4 13 64 64 6 64 64 412 4 4
23 8-1 110 9-0 64 10 64 11 20 64 35 11 62 64 425 6 6
24 7-11 106 8-6 64 10 9 10 64 64 64 13 64+ 64 426 4 4
25 8-1 97 8-0 13 10 64 10 52 64 64 24 64 64 429 5 5
26 8-3 104 8-9 7 16 64 10 64 64 16 64 64 64 433 4 4
27 8-0 98 8-0 64 10 43 6 63 64 64 10 64 64 452 5 5
28 7-9 92 7-3 19 10 30 10 64 64 64 64 64 64 453 4 4
29 8-0 95 7-9 64 11 64 7 64 64 62 64 11 64 475 4 4
30 8-1 91 7-6 64 10 37* 10 35 64 64 64 64 64 476 4 3
31 7-11 109 8-9 64 5 63* 15 12 64 64 64+ 64 64 479 5 4
32 8-0 92 7-6 64 10 49 12 64 29 64 64 64 64 484 4 4
33 7-10 104 8-3 64 4 39* 7 64 50* 64 64 64 64 484 4 2
34 8-0 101 8-3 25 10 64 13 64 64 64 64 64 64 496 3 3
35 7-11 93 7-6 64 18 64 10 28 64 64 64 57 64 497 4 4
♦ solution not verbalised 
+ solved
TABLE 1--Contintted
SUBJECT DATA AND RESULTS OF TESTING. GROUP III
Sub­
ject
No* C.A. I.Q. M.A.
Problem Numbers and Trials
8 10
Total
Trials
Total
Prob­
lems
Solved
Total
Solved
and
Verbal­
ized
36 8-1 68 5-8 64 10 64 10 64+ 64 64 18 64 64 486 4 4
37 8-2 68 5-9 64 10 64 13 64 18* 64 64: 64 64 489 3 2
38 7-11 68 5-7 64 10 64 10 46 64 64 64 64 64 514 3 3
39 7-9 60 4-10 64 10 64 10 64 64 64 64 64 64 532 2 2
40 8-3 70 6-0 64 12 64 11 64 64 64 64 64 64 535 2 2
41 8-0 69 5-9 64 10 64 18 64 64 64 64 64 64 540 2 2
42 7-11 58 4-10 64 24* 64 11 64 64 64 64 64 64 547 2 1
43 8-3 65 5-7 64 17 64 24* 64 64 64 64 64 64 553 2 1
44 7-9 66 5-4 64 12* 33* 63 64 64 64 64 64 64 556 3 1
45 7-9 57 4-8 64 31 64 38 64 64 64 64 64 64 581 2 2
46 8-3 56 4-10 64 10 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 586 1 1
47 8-0 67 5-7 64 10* 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 586 1 0
48 7-11 67 5-6 64 64 64 14 64 64 64 64 64 64 590 1 1
49 7-11 58 4-10 64 20 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 596 1 1
50 8-3 59 5-1 64 27 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 603 1 1
* solution not verbalised 
+ solved
TABLE 2
OBSERVED VALUES AND CRITICAL VALUES OF STATISTICAL TESTS
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST
Observed Values of U Critical Values of U
Groups Number of Number of Number of .05 level .002 level Significant
trials problems problems two-tailed two-tailed difference*
solved solved and
verbalized
I vs. II 20.5 35-9 8 93 61 .002 level
I vs. Ill 0 0 0 80 51 •002 level
II vs. Ill 2 5 75 47 .002 level
*To be significant, the observed values must be equal to or less than the critical value.
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION
Number of Trials vs. Number of Problems Solved
Critical Values1 of rho
Groups Number in Observed .05 level .01 level Significant
group rho one-tailed one-tailed correlation*
I 18 .76 .399 .564 .01 level
II 17 .71 .402 .583 •01 level
III 15 .85 .440 .623 .01 level
*To be significant, the observed value must be equal to or greater than the critical ArauLue.
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the problem solving ability as measured 
by the non-language multiple-choice Rroblem Box was made be­
tween very bright, average, and mentally defective white eight* 
year-old children attending the public schools in the vicinity 
of Norman, Oldahona, The mental ages varied between M.A, 10-6 
and 12-0 far the 18 very bri^t children, between M.A. 7-3 to 
9-0 for the 17 average children, and between 4-8 to 6-0 for 
the 15 mentally defective children.
Intelligence was found to be a good predictor of the 
non-language problem solving ability of idilte eight-year-bid 
children attending the public schools.
Either the total number of trials used or the total 
number of problems solved was found to measure about equally 
the non-language problem solving ability of white eight-year- 
old children attending the public schools.
Discussion
The conclusion reached in this study agrees with the 
findings of Teska (1942) idio concluded that the predictive 
value of brightness for the degree of success in the problem 
solving situation was greater than hither mental w  chronological
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age. Hensley (1957) concluded that the ability to solve pro­
blems was probably more a function of mental age than either 
chrondlogical age or intelligence. Both of these investigators 
used the original model of the Problem Box. Moffitt and Coates 
(1969) in a two-choice test of problem solving ability reported 
that performance was better for higher than lower I.Q. groups.
Thirteen children failed to verbalise the sblution to 
sixteen solved problems. Two of the very bright failed to 
verbalise one problem each. Six average were unable to 
verbalise eight solved problems, five of them on problem 3*
Five mentally deficient subjects were unable to verbalise six 
solved problems, three of then on problem 2. It was interesting 
to note that only one very bright child solved problem 10 but 
was unable to verbalise the solution idiile three average 
children solved problem 10 and one was able to verbalise the 
solution. A majority of the mentally defective children in 
this study said. "I don't know” idien asked how they got the 
red li^t every time. Stephens (1966) reported that subnormal 
boys evidenced significantly less ability to provide names 
for categories they had used successfully in previous tasks 
than normal boys of the same age.
After the subjects in this study had attempted all 
ten of the problems, none of them solved all ten and only one 
very bright solved nine, each was asked lAat thqr had tried 
in order to scdve the problems. Predominantly the responses 
were. "I don't remember.” Other responses were not possible 
solutions to problems not already solved. This indicates
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that 64 trials per problem were sufficient. In describing the 
behavior of seven-and-eight-year old children Piaget (1928) 
observed, "In short, as soon as the problem contains ever so 
little complexity the child seems to conduct his reasoning 
process much as we do ours in the course of a purely empiri­
cal problem (such as a puzzle, etc.); i.e. he keeps no record 
of his successive attenqits, and his mind proceeds by a series 
of fumbling movements, each of which is conscious, but that 
does not easily admit of retrospection as a whole. If after 
this is over we ask the child to describe his search, all he 
gives us is a device for finding the solution, and a device 
which presupposes the solution in question. Never does he 
succeed in describing his reasoning process as such" [p. 2ll].
The data obtained in this study indicates that the 
order of presentation of the problems, the least to the most 
difficult, should be changed. The order of difficulty indicated 
by this study was problems 1, 2, 4, 5» 8, 3, 6, 7, 9» and 10.
It is suggested that testing with the Problem Box 
might be discontinued after three consecutive problems are 
failed and the balance assumed unsolved and scored as the 
maximum number of trials permitted per problem. It did not 
appear that the number of trials permitted in an attesqat to 
solve a problem should be increased from 64. It appeared 
to the examiner that many of the lower I.Q. children became 
restless and disturbed, possibly on account of continued 
failure, in spite of the occasional flash of the red light.
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Suggestions for Additional stuHies with the Problem Box
1) A further investigation of the order of diffl. 
culty of the problems should be made,
2) Additional problems with two different sises 
of the square and triangle as another variable might be con­
sidered, Lehtio (1970) with an apparatus similar to the 
Problem Box reported the order of difficulty as being color, 
size, and shape, A description of the 18 subjects was not 
reported,
3) An investigation using older subjects having 
the same chronblogieal age with controlled I.Q. scores and 
varying mental ages should be made,
k) A timing and recording device might be added 
to the Problem Box so that a recorded tape of the time be­
tween choices and the button pushed might be automatically 
recorded. The subject might be less disturbed if the examiner 
did not have to score each choice, and the examiner would 
have more time to observe the behavior of the subject.
REFERENCES
Aarons, Leon. Serial learning and generalizing abstraction. 
American Journal of Psychology. 1933, 45, 417J4-32.
Alpert, Augusta. The solving of nroblems situation by pre­
school children. New York; Bureau of Publications, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1928.
Ausubel, David P. Educational nsvcholology a cognitive view.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966.
Bedell, R. C. The relationship between ability to recall and 
the ability to infer in specific learning situation. 
Bulletin of Northeastern Missouri State Teachers 
College. 193^ . 3». No. 9. 55.
Billings, H. L. Problem solving in different fields of en­
deavor. American Journal of Psychology. 193^ , 46, 259-272.
Blake, Kathryn A., and Williams, Charlotte L. Induction and 
deduction and retarded, normal, and superior subjects' 
concept attainment. American Journal of Mental 
Deficiency. 1963, 73» 226-231.
Bloom, Benjamin S. Stability and change in human characteristics. 
New York; John Wil^ and Sons, Inc., 1964.
Braine, M. D. S. The ontogency of certain logical operations; 
Piaget's formulation examined by noiverbal methods. 
Psychological Monographs. 1959, 73, No. 5.
Broady, L. Comparable tests of verbal and non-verbal reasMiing; 
their construction and application to developmental 
problems. Journal of Educational Psychology. 1940,
31, 180-194.
Burtt, Harold E. A stuc^  of the behavior of the white rat fay
the multiple choice method. Journal of Animal Behavior. 
1916, 6, 222-246.
Cantor, G. N. Effects of three types of pretraining on discrimi­
nation learning in prescho^ children. Journal of 
Experimental Psychtdogy, 1955 , 49, 339-3^
62
63
Cattell, R. B. Theory of fltiid and crystallized intelligence. 
Journal of Educational Psychology. 1963. 54, 1-22.
Cobum, C. A., and Yerkes, R. M. A study of the behavior of 
the Crow Corvus Americanus and by the multiple-choice 
method. Journal of Animal Behavior. 1915» 5» 75-114.
De Sanctis, Swte. Visual apprenhensim in the maze behavior 
of normal and feeble-minded children. Journal of 
General Psychology. 1931, 39, 463J169.
Dewey, John, How we think. Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 191O.
Dewey, John, How we think. (2nd ed.) Boston: D. C. Heath
and Co., 1933.
D'Zurilla, Thomas J., and Goldfried, Marvin R. lYoblem
solving and behavior modification. Journal of Abmorma] 
Psychology. 1971, 78, 107-126.
Eagleson, 0. W. A study of puzzle solving. Journal of 
Psychology. 19**0, 9» 259-268,
Ewert, P. H., and Lambert, J. F. Part II, the effect of verbal
instructim upon the formation of a concept. Journal
of Genetic Psychology. 1932, 6, 400-413.
Gellermann, Louis W. The double alternation proia.em II.
The behavior of children and human adults in a double 
alternation temporal maze. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology. 1931, 39, 197-225%
Gerjuoy, I. R. Discrimination learning as a functicm of the 
similarity of the stimulus name. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Iowa State University, 1953.
Gould, H. C., and Perrin, F. A. C. A comparison of factors 
involved in the maze learning of human adults and 
children. Journal of Expérimental Psychology. 1916,
1, 122-154.
Gozali, Joav. Inqmlsivity-reflectivity as problem solying 
styles among educable mentally retarded children. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency. 1969, 73, 864867.
Graham, J. L. An experiment in generalizing: a universal pro­
blem, Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1938, 23,
96-100.
Guilford, J. P. The nature of human intelligence. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 196?.
64
Guilford, J, P. General psychology» (2nd ed.) New ïoric:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1952.
Hamilton, G. V. A study of trial and error reactions in
mammals. Journal of Animal Behavior. 1911, 1, 33-36»
Harter, G. L. Overt trial and error in the problem solving
of preschool children. Journal of Genetic Psychology. 
1930, 45, 361-372.
Harter, Susan. Discrimination learning set in children as a 
function of IQ and HA. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology. 1^5, 2, 31-41.
Harter, Susan. Mental age, IQ, and motivational factws in 
the discrimination leaniing set performance of normal 
and retarded children. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology. 1967. 5, 123-l4l.
Hazlitt, Victoria. Children's thinking. British Journal of 
Psychology. 1933, 45, 663-677.
Heath, Paul Allen. A comparative study in problem solving 
ability of a group of negro and white children of 
average intelligence by socio-economic level. Unpub­
lished Ed.d. dissertatiwi. University of Oldahoma, 1970,
Heidbreder, E. Problem solving in children and adults.
Journal of Genetic Psychology. 1928, 35, 522-545»
Hensley, Horace Gene. A comparative study in problem solving 
of bright and dull children. Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Oldahoma, 1957»
Hicks, V. C., aM Carr, H. A. Human reactions in a maze.
Journal of Animal Behavior. 1912, 2, 900125»
House, Betty J., and Zeaman, David. A comparison of dis­
crimination learning in normal and mentally defective 
children. Child Develonment. 1958, 29, 4ll-4l6.
Hull, C. L. Quantitative aspects of the evolution of concepts. 
Psychological Monographs. 1920, No. 28, 5-6.
Husband, R. W. A comparison of human adults and lAite rats 
in maze learning. Journal of Comparative Psychology. 
1929. 9. 361-377»
Inhelder, Barbel., and Piaget, Jean. The growth of logical 
thinking. New York: Basic Books, 1958»
Inhelder, B&rbel., and Piaget, Jean. The early growth of logic 
in the child. New York; Harper and Row, 1964.
65
Jeffrey, W. E. Simultaneous and successive presentation of 
stimuli in discrimination learning with children,
American Psychology. 1958, 13, 333.
Johnson, Donald M, The psychology of thought and .judgement.
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955.
Kohler, W, The mentality of apes. New York: Harcourt- 
Brace and Co,, 1925.
Kuenne, M. R, Experimental investigatioi of the relation of 
language to transposition behavior in young children.
Journal of Experimental Psychology. 19^, 36, 471-490,
Lehtio, Pekka K, The organization of component decisions in 
visual search, Acta Psychologica-European Journal of 
Psychology. 1970, 33, 93-105.
Lipton, Cheryl,, and Overton, Willis F, Anticipatory imagery 
and modified anagram solutions: a developmental stuc^ . 
Child Develorment. 1971, 42, 615-623,
Long, L,, and Welch, L, The development of the ability to 
discriminate and match numbers. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology. 1941, 59, 377-387.
LumLey, Frederick, An investigation of the responses made in 
learning a multiple choice maze. Psychological 
Monographs. 1931, 32, No, I89,
Maier, N. R. F. Reasming in children. Journal Comprehensive 
Psychology. 1936, 21, 357-366,
Matheson, E, A study of problem solving behavior in pre­
school children. Child Development. 1931, 2, 242-262,
Mattson, M, L. The relatim between the complexity of the
habit to be acquired and the form of the learning curve 
in young children. Genetic P8vch(d.ogical MonograiAs.
1933. 13. 299-396,
McGinnis, E, The acquisition and interference of motor-habits 
in young children. Genetic Psychological Monographs.
1929, 6, 209-311.
Merrifield, P. R., Guilford, J. P., Christensen, P. R., FTick, J. W, 
The role of intellectual factors in problem solving. 
Psychological Monographs. 1962, 76, 1-20,
Moffitt, Alan R,, and Coastes, Brian, Problem-solving strategies 
and performance of severely retarded children, American 
Jour^ of Mental Deficiency. 1969, 73, 774-784,
66
Moore, T. V. The reasoning ability of children in the first 
years of school life. Studies in Psychology and 
Psychiatry. 1929, 29, No, 2,
Mussen, Paul H. (Ed.) Handbook of research methods in child
deyelocment. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., I960.
Norcross, K. J, Effects on discrimination performance of 
similarity of previously acquired stimulus names.
Journal Experimental Psychology. 1958, 56, 305-309»
Pepper, Sidney, Verbalization of problem-solving behavior.
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oldahona, 
1966.
Peterson, J. Experiments in rational learning. Psychological 
Review. 1918, 25, ^3-^7»
Piaget, Jean. The stages of the intellectual development of 
the child. Pull«tin of the Menninger Clinic. 1962,
26, 120-128.
Piaget, Jean. Judgement and reasoning in the child. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1928.
Piaget, Jean. Six psychological studies. New York: Random 
House, 1964.
lÿle, W. H. An experimental study of the development of
certain aspects of reasoning. Journal of Educational 
Psychology. 1935, 26, 539-546.
Ray, J. J. The generalizing ability of dull, bright, and
superior children. Peabody Contribution to Education. 
1936, No. 175.
Roberts, K. E. The ability of preschool children to solve 
problems in which a single principle of relationship 
is kept constant. Journal of Genetic Psychology.
1932, 40, 118-135.
Roslow, S. A statistical analysis of rational learning pro­
blems. Journal of Genetic Psychology. 1936, 48, 441-46?.
Ruger, H. A. The psychology of efficiency. Archives of 
Psychology. 1940, No. 249, 58.
Sargent, S. S. The psychology of efficiency. Archives of 
Psychology. 1940, 249, 58.
Sells, S. B. The atmosphere effect: an experimental study
of reasoning. Archives of Psychology, 1%6, 29, No. 200.
6?
Siegel, Sidney, Nontaraïaetric statistics for the behavioral 
sciences. New York: McGraw-EELll Book Co., 195^ ,
Smoke, Kenneth L, An objective stndy of concept formation. 
Psychological Monographs. 1932, 42, No, 191, 1-40,
Stejdiens, %att E, A comparison of the performance of normal 
and subnormal boys and structured categorisation tasks. 
Exceptional Children. 1964, 30, 311-315*
Stephens %att E, Category usage by normal and mentally
retarded boys. Child Develorment, 1966, 37, 355-361*
Ste]±ens, %att E, Labeling errors of mentally subnormal
children in a concept task, American Jonmal of Mental 
Deficiency. 1968, 73, 273-278,
Stevenson, Harold W,, Klein, Robert E., Hale, Gordon A,, and
Miller, Leon K, Solution of anagrams: a developmental 
study. Child Development. 1968, 39, 905-912.
Stevenson, H, W,, and Zigler, E, F, Probability learning in
children:, Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1958, 56,
185-192*
Symonds, Percival M,, Education and the psychology of thinking. 
New York: McGraw-Hill &)6k Co., 1936,
Terman, Lewis m., and Merrill, Maud A, Stanford-Binet Intel­
ligence Seals, Manual for the thifd revision form L-M, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co,, I960,
Terrell, G,, Jr., and Kenned^ , W, A, Discrimination learning 
and tranposition in children as a function of the 
nature of the reward. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Teska, Percy T, Performance of dull and bright childrmi in
a non-language multiple-choice problem situatiw, Ihi- 
pubLished Fh,D, dissertation, IMversity of Wisconsin,
1942,
Thurstone, L, L,, and Ackerson, L, The mental growth curve 
for the Binet tests. Journal Educational Psychology.
1929, 20, 569-583*
Vickers, W,, and Hoskins, V, H, Results from some new tests
of practical abilities, British Journal of Psychology.
1929, 20, 66-81.
Vinacke, W, Edgar, The psychology of thiiridng. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952,
68
Wenger, M. A, Path-selection behavior of young children in 
bo^y-mazee. Jounal of Expérimental Education. 1933»
2, 197-236.
Wieg, E. L. Bi-lateral transfer in the motor learning of young
children and adults. Child Develorment. 1932. 3» 247-268.
Wilkins» M. C. The effect of changed material on ability to
do formal syllogistic reasoning. Archives of Psychology. 
1928, 16, No. 102, 83.
Winch, W. H. Children's reasonings; experimental studies of 
reasoning in school children. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. 1921-22, 6, l22-l4l.
Yerkes, R. M. The study of human behavior. Science. 1914,
39» 625-633.
Yerkes, R. H. Methods of exhibiting reactive tendencies
characteristic of ontogenetic and phylogentic stages. 
Journal of Animal Behavior. 1917» 7» II-I8.
Yerkes, R. M. A new method of studying the ideational behavior 
of defective and deranged as compared with normal 
individuals. .înamal of Comparative Psychology. 1921»
1» 369-39^ .
Yerkes, R. H., and Cobum, C. A. A study of the behavior of 
the Pig Bus Scrofa by the multiple-choice method.
Journal of Animal Behavior. 1915, 5» 185-225.
Yerkes, R. H., and Rossy, Cecelio S. A point scale for measure­
ment of intelligence in adolescent and adult in­
dividuals. Boston Medical and Surgical Journal. 1917»
176, 564-573.
APPENDIX
F ig u re  1. F ro n t v iew  o f the P roblem  Box
F ig u re  2. S ide v ie w  o f the  P roblem  Box
ro
F ig u re  3. Inside m echanism  o f the P rob lem  Box
73
LCOeX gOMwmaw 
RoTAKr Kâwwr
Figure 4. Electrical Schematic Diagram of the Problem Box
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